On the basis of a detailed case study of the High Forest Zone of Ghana, the paper challenges the common narrative of REDD as being fast and easy. The paper analyses proximate and underlying causes of deforestation and degradation and finds that these processes are driven by multiple underlying causes. The paper goes on to argue that the causes of deforestation and degradation that are found within the realm of the forestry sector, to which REDD measures will be largely confined, have emerged as a result of a political economy that gives priority to economic development over forest conservation, while at the same time allowing powerful interest groups, in particular the political and administrative elite, to financially benefit from resource depletion. The analysis suggests that forest conserving policy reforms are unlikely to come fast and easy, and that the prospect of future REDD payments may not accelerate them. It is argued that the case of Ghana is not unique and that REDD implementation may face similar constraints in many developing countries.

The paper investigates law compliance in case of on-farm timber extraction in Ghana. It empirically investigates compliance with rules that (i) require timber operators to obtain prior and informed consent from the farmers, (ii) require timber operators to pay appropriate and timely compensation for crop damage caused by timber extraction and (iii) ban chainsaw lumbering. The study documents a low level of compliance in all three domains. Subsequently, the paper discusses the underlying causes for the observed low compliance. The low compliance level is attributed to a legislation, and enforcement, that provides huge financial incentives for non-compliance for both farmers and timber operators, and in the latter case both with and without legal permits. At the same time the regulation is perceived to violate their moral values. The paper underlines the interests of the political elite as decisive in shaping the current regulation and the way it is implemented on the ground. It asserts that eliciting compliance requires consideration of both the instrumental and normative perspectives; else it becomes illusive. The study thus challenges the typical response of governments in developing countries, who, supported by donor agencies, attempt to elicit compliance through enhanced law enforcement efforts. The results presented on the Ghana case suggest that such an approach is unlikely to elicit compliance.